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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Date: NOV 23 2011 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER F[redacted]

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner describes itself as a shipping and packing company on the Form I-140. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an assistant financial manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's February 16, 2010 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment

Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on November 12, 2008. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is $55,619 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a master's degree in business administration or a related field and five years of experience in the proffered position or related occupation, or, alternatively, a bachelor's degree in business administration or related field and five years of experience in the position offered, or five years of experience as a financial manager, operations manager, financial analyst "or related."

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.[1]

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on November 27, 2000, to have a gross annual income of $200,000, and to currently employ one worker. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year runs on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on May 11, 2009, the beneficiary did not claim to have previously worked for the petitioner.[2]

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[1] The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

[2] The petitioner and beneficiary have submitted contradictory information about the beneficiary's past employment. On the ETA Form 9089 signed by the petitioner and beneficiary (the beneficiary signed the document on May 11, 2009), the beneficiary did not claim to have previously worked for the petitioner yet the petitioner submitted a 2008 W-2 Form showing the beneficiary earned $11,816 in wages from the petitioner in that year. On September 3, 2009, the beneficiary signed, under penalty of law for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact, a Form G-325A, filed with her Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, wherein she was asked to list her employment for the past five years. The beneficiary listed no employment on that form for the five year period preceding September 3, 2009 yet she was allegedly paid wages by the petitioner in 2008. Further, the ETA Form 9089 signed by the beneficiary under penalty of perjury states that the beneficiary was employed by [redacted]. from September 24, 2002 through June 1, 2008. The petitioner also submitted an employment experience letter from [redacted] attesting to the beneficiary's employment with that organization from September 24, 2002 through June 1, 2008 to meet the experience required on the ETA Form 9089. The beneficiary also failed to list this experience on the Form G-325A. The record contains no explanation for these discrepancies. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date. The petitioner did, however, submit W-2 Forms showing the beneficiary had been paid wages as follows:

- 2008 - $11,816
- 2009 - $7,487.13[3,4]

Based upon the forgoing documentation, the petitioner must establish that it has the ability to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages paid to the beneficiary in 2008 and 2009. Those sums are as follows:

- 2008 - $43,803
- 2009 - $48,131.87

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[3] The position must be for full-time employment. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.3; 656.10(c)(10). From the W-2 Statements submitted and the petitioner's tax returns, it is not clear that the petitioner employs anyone on a full-time basis. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988).

[4] The petitioner submitted copies of checks paid to the beneficiary between January 1, 2010 and February 25, 2010 in the amount of $5,476.32.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

> The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.
>
> We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures

should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on January 21, 2010 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2010 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2009 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's 2008 tax return states its net income as (-$7,339). The petitioner did not submit a copy of its 2009 tax return but did submit an audited financial statement as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) which stated a net income of $23,282.99 for 2009.

Therefore, for the years 2008 and 2009, the petitioner's 2008 tax return and 2009 audited financial statement do not state sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage or the difference between the full proffered wage and wages paid to the beneficiary.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.[5] A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's 2008 tax return states its end-of-year net current assets as $12,282. The audited financial statement for 2009 states net current assets as $21,843.44.

Therefore, for the years 2008 and 2009, neither the petitioner's 2008 tax return nor the 2009 audited financial statement state sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage or the difference between the proffered wage and wages paid to the beneficiary in those years.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward. Counsel states that the beneficiary replaced

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[5]According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

another employee who earned $3,591.68 in 2009[6] and that those wages should be considered in an ability to pay analysis. Counsel further asserts that the petitioner's net income, net current assets, replacement employee wages and wages paid to the beneficiary should be added together in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

Counsel advocates combining the petitioner's net income with its net current assets to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. This approach is unacceptable because net income and net current assets are not, in the view of the AAO, cumulative. The AAO views net income and net current assets as two different methods of demonstrating the petitioner's ability to pay the wage--one retrospective and one prospective. Net income is retrospective in nature because it represents the sum of income remaining after all expenses were paid over the course of the previous tax year. Conversely, the net current assets figure is a prospective "snapshot" of the net total of petitioner's assets that will become cash within a relatively short period of time minus those expenses that will come due within that same period of time. Thus, the petitioner is expected to receive roughly one-twelfth of its net current assets during each month of the coming year. Given that net income is retrospective and net current assets are prospective in nature, the AAO does not agree with counsel that the two figures can be combined in a meaningful way to illustrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a single tax year. Moreover, combining the net income and net current assets could double-count certain figures, such as cash on hand and, in the case of a taxpayer who reports taxes pursuant to accrual convention, accounts receivable.

Counsel states that the petitioner replaced a former employee who performed the same tasks to be performed by the beneficiary. The petitioner submitted documentation showing the income earned by that employee in 2009. The petitioner did not, however, specifically state the duties that the

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[6] The petitioner's 2008 tax return indicates that the employee who earned $3,591.68 and was being replaced by the beneficiary owned 50 per cent of the petitioner in that year. Florida state corporation records still list this individual as one of the company's officers. *See* http://www.sunbiz.org/scripts/cordet.exe?action=DETFIL&inq_doc_number=P00000109092&inq_came_from=NAMFWD&cor_web_names_seq_number=0000&names_name_ind=N&names_cor_number=&names_name_seq=&names_name_ind=&names_comp_name=GPIMPORTEXPORT&names_filing_type= (accessed November 22, 2011). USCIS may reject a fact stated in the petition if it does not believe that fact to be true. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); *see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S.*, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989); *Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson,* 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); *Systronics Corp. v. INS,* 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988).

former employee performed. Thus, it cannot be determined that the duties of the former employee were the same duties to be performed by the beneficiary and the wages paid to that employee will not be considered. It is noted that even if those wages were considered, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage for 2008 or 2009 as the wages paid to the beneficiary plus the wages paid to the replaced employee when added to either the petitioner's 2009 net income or net current assets are still less than the proffered wage. The same would be true for 2008, where the evidence does not establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Further, as noted above, that employee is still an officer of the corporation, despite the petitioner's assertion that the employee left the company "of his volition." It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not established a consistent history of profitability and growth so that it can be determined that it is more likely than not that it has maintained the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward. The petitioner's tax return and audited financial statement show low or negative net income and low net current assets. The Form I-140 states that the petitioner employs only one individual. Total wages paid and total officer compensation paid in 2008 combined was less than one-half the proffered wage. Similarly, total wages and officer compensation paid in 2009 amounted to about one-fifth of the total proffered wage. The record does not establish that the petitioner's reputation in the industry is such that it is more likely than not that the petitioner has maintained the continuing ability to pay the proffered

wage from the priority date onward. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary meets the education and experience requirements of the ETA Form 9089. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). As noted above, the petitioner must demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

As previously noted, the labor certification requires a master's degree in business administration and five years of experience, or alternatively, a bachelor's degree in business administration with five years of experience as a financial manager, operations manager, financial analyst "or related." The petitioner submitted an experience letter from [redacted] which states that the beneficiary was employed by that organization for more than five years (September 24, 2002 through June 1, 2008) performing duties which fall within those stated on the labor certification for the present position. As previously noted above in footnote 2, however, the petitioner and beneficiary provided conflicting information about the beneficiary's past employment history which brings into question the credibility of the experience letter. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). These inconsistencies must be resolved before we can accept that the letter submitted would evidence that the beneficiary had the experience required for the position offered. Further, the documentation submitted does not establish that the beneficiary has at least a bachelor's degree which is required for the position if past work experience is to be considered. The petitioner submitted an improperly translated copy of a foreign degree.[7] Submitted with that document is a portion of a foreign degree evaluation which states that the beneficiary's foreign degree is the foreign equivalent to a bachelor's degree in business administration from an accredited college or university in the United States based on education alone. While the name of the evaluator is stated, the organization for whom she is employed is unknown, as the evaluation submitted appears to be a partial copy. Copies of transcripts are not enclosed to determine or verify the length and nature of the beneficiary's studies. These deficiencies must be resolved in any further filings to properly determine that the beneficiary has the required education. Under these circumstances, the petitioner

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[7] 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) provides any document containing foreign language submitted to [USCIS] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English. The statement submitted lacks the translator's signature.

has not established that the beneficiary meets the education and experience requirements of the ETA Form 9089.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.